Recognition of Somaliland would unlock alternative critical infrastructure and protect European consumers from shipping lanes threatened by piracy and the weaponisation of geography
Oil prices continue to hover above $100, as gas prices have jumped 6%. European governments have responded, once again, with panicked statements. As global headlines keep reminding us that a fifth of the world’s oil and gas flows through the narrow waters of Hormuz, Europe now depends on Donald Trump to keep them open.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European leaders moved quickly to reduce Russian energy dependency, promising new strategies centred on energy diversification. But speed is not always a strategy. The past few weeks have made it clear that diversification alone cannot reduce European vulnerability.
Resilience requires a reliable foothold.
At Bab al-Mandab, 1,500 miles west of the Strait of Hormuz, the port of Berbera overlooks shipping lanes carrying 12% of global trade. But Europe has no foothold in Berbera because the city sits in a country that European governments have spent 34 years pretending does not exist.
The Republic of Somaliland has governed itself since 1991 with a functioning currency, a professional military, and democratic elections. All Somaliland lacks is international recognition – legal legitimacy that global and regional powers withhold to avoid offending Somalia, a state with no territorial control over Somaliland’s borders.
I am one of approximately 400 people to have visited every UN-recognised country. After 193 border crossings ranging from Afghanistan to Liberia, you quickly learn to spot the hallmarks of a functioning state.
When comparing Somaliland and Somalia, the contrast could not be starker. On my last visit to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, movement required armed escorts, with my security detail clearing the area for each photo stop. In Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, I walked unescorted to currency exchanges where the Somaliland shilling trades openly. At intersections, traffic police were directing cars past election posters advertising political candidates in competitive elections.
Pretending these two places are equivalent would be amusing if the consequences were not being measured in shipping insurance premiums and European gas prices.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention sets four criteria for recognition of statehood: a permanent population, defined territory, effective government, and a capacity for foreign relations. As a lawyer, I could hardly imagine a stronger case for recognition. Somaliland has maintained effective control over its borders since 1991, Hargeisa governs roughly 5.7 million people, has held six successful competitive elections, and signs bilateral agreements with Middle Eastern states and African neighbours. In sum, Somaliland easily passes.
Regional powers already understand what London and Paris are refusing to admit. In 2017, the UAE’s DP World invested $442 million to expand Berbera’s port capacity. Last December, Israel formally recognised Somaliland – the first country to do so – with embassies expected this year. Recent reports suggest Israel and Somaliland are discussing a military facility to track Houthi activity in Yemen. In short, leaders in the neighbourhood are positioning themselves around Berbera’s geographic assets.
Military analysts will be aware that Europe already has a presence in the crowded Red Sea. Djibouti has spent 30 years monetising its strategic geography to whoever pays, hosting French, American, and Chinese military bases within miles of each other. A foothold at Berbera should not be seen as replacing Djibouti. Rather, Somaliland offers coverage of a different geographic chokepoint within the same critical corridor where Europe is already present.
We often hear that recognition would strain relations with African states and violate African Union principles on territorial integrity. However, the last few years have seen greater pragmatism among African states in dealing with Somaliland. In 2024, landlocked Ethiopia signed a memorandum with Somaliland to secure access to the Red Sea.
More controversially, in May 2025 Kenyan President William Ruto greenlighted a Somaliland liaison office in Nairobi, despite contradictory statements from Kenya’s own foreign ministry. If Addis Ababa – the host of the African Union headquarters – and Nairobi are willing to treat Somaliland as a functional partner, it is time to revise long-held deference to colonial borders.
The transactional Trump administration has clear incentives to move on Somaliland – strategic access, rare earth minerals, and a footing just down the coast from Beijing’s first overseas military base. A congressional bill on the recognition of Somaliland is currently sitting with the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, presumably trying to catch Trump’s attention.
China, meanwhile, firmly opposes recognition, while Russia has previously flirted with Hargeisa for identical reasons. If Washington acts first, Europe may find itself in a Hormuz crisis 2.0 – someone else’s terms, in someone else’s crisis.
As they scramble to deploy naval escorts and give carefully worded statements on defensive positions, Starmer, Macron and Merz make clear that Europe’s response to global crises remains reactive. In 2026, Europe’s refusal to recognise a functioning state carries real costs, as European consumers are priced out by post-colonial pieties.
Recognition of Somaliland would unlock alternative critical infrastructure and protect European consumers from shipping lanes threatened by piracy, Houthi missile attacks and the weaponisation of geography.
Statehood is ultimately granted by virtue of political realities and interests. Luckily for Europe, Somaliland’s case is unusually clean. A former British colonial entity, which was voluntarily merged with Italian Somalia, and then voluntarily separated, with over three decades of stable self-governance. Catalonia it is not.
In preparing for the next energy crisis, either Europe recognises what already exists, or waits and bargains for access with whoever gets there first.
Daniel Herszberg is a doctoral researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, and a doctoral associate of the Oxford China Centre.
https://www.euractiv.com/opinion/why-somaliland-matters-for-europes-energy-strategy/