Sara Al-saeed
Jul 07, 2026
Can a political entity remain outside the community of recognised states for more than three decades despite demonstrating many of the practical attributes of statehood?
For Somaliland, this question has shaped its international existence since 1991. Yet it also exposes a broader challenge within the contemporary international order. While international law has developed an extensive body of doctrine governing sovereignty, territorial integrity, and statehood, it offers remarkably little guidance on a different question: when should an enduring political reality be reflected in diplomatic recognition?
Recognition is commonly portrayed as the natural consequence of objective legal criteria. In practice, however, it has always reflected an interaction between law and politics. Strategic interests, regional stability, historical precedent, and geopolitical calculation all influence recognition decisions. States remain free to determine whom they recognise, and no international institution can compel them to act otherwise.
This political discretion is both inevitable and legitimate. Yet it cannot remain indefinitely detached from political reality without raising broader questions about the coherence of the international system itself.
The legitimacy of international order depends not only upon preserving legal continuity but also upon ensuring that legal principles continue to correspond with the realities they are intended to regulate. When a political entity exercises the essential functions of government consistently over an extended period while continuing to be treated as merely provisional, the burden of explanation gradually shifts. The question is no longer simply why recognition should occur, but why it continues to be withheld.
Few contemporary cases illustrate this dilemma more clearly than Somaliland.
For more than three decades, Somaliland has maintained effective territorial administration, functioning public institutions, independent security forces, competitive elections, its own currency, and the practical capacity to engage internationally in trade, security, and regional cooperation. During the same period, it has established a reputation for relative political stability within one of the world’s most strategically significant and politically volatile regions.
Despite this record, it remains largely absent from the formal diplomatic architecture of international society.
Most analyses explain this paradox through debates over self-determination, territorial integrity, African precedent, or the legal consequences of the 1960 union with Somalia. These debates remain important, but they share a common assumption: that the central question is whether Somaliland deserves recognition.
This article proceeds from a different premise.
Rather than asking whether Somaliland should be recognised, it asks whether the contemporary international system possesses a coherent standard for recognising long-standing de facto states.
Current practice suggests that it does not.
Some internationally recognised states exercise only limited authority across significant parts of their territory, while other political entities have demonstrated decades of effective governance, institutional continuity, and growing regional relevance without achieving widespread diplomatic recognition. The resulting divergence between political reality and diplomatic practice has become increasingly difficult to justify.
This article does not argue that every unrecognised entity should become an independent state, nor that recognition should follow every claim to self-government. Its argument is considerably narrower.
It contends that Somaliland represents an exceptional case. After more than three decades of institutional durability, historical continuity, effective governance, and increasing strategic relevance, continued non-recognition no longer appears to be merely an exercise in diplomatic caution. It raises a more fundamental question about whether the principles governing international recognition are being applied with sufficient consistency.
Answering that question requires reconsidering one of the most enduring assumptions in international relations.
Recognition does not create political reality. Its purpose is to acknowledge a political reality that has already emerged.
States are not created by recognition. They emerge through the sustained exercise of public authority over territory and population. Recognition neither establishes institutions nor creates governments; rather, it acknowledges that a political order has become sufficiently established to participate formally within international society.
This distinction lies at the heart of one of the oldest debates in international law.
The declaratory theory maintains that a state exists once it satisfies the accepted criteria of statehood, irrespective of whether other governments choose to recognise it. Recognition merely confirms an existing legal reality. The constitutive theory reaches the opposite conclusion, arguing that an entity acquires full international personality only through recognition by other states.
Neither theory, however, adequately reflects contemporary practice.
If the declaratory approach were applied consistently, political entities that demonstrate effective and durable governance would eventually receive recognition as a matter of legal coherence. Yet recognition is rarely determined by legal doctrine alone. Strategic interests, regional politics, and diplomatic calculation frequently shape both its timing and its scope.
The constitutive approach presents an equally significant difficulty. If recognition alone creates international personality, then comparable political realities may produce fundamentally different legal outcomes depending upon the geopolitical preferences of recognising governments. Under such circumstances, statehood becomes determined less by observable political development than by diplomatic choice.
In reality, contemporary recognition practice occupies a position between these two theories. Law establishes the normative framework, but politics largely determines when recognition is ultimately extended.
This interaction between law and politics is neither unusual nor inherently problematic.
The difficulty arises when the gap between political reality and diplomatic acknowledgement becomes so prolonged that the original justification for withholding recognition becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
Immediately after conflict, caution is often both prudent and necessary. Political settlements may collapse, institutions may fail, territorial control may shift, and negotiated agreements may fundamentally alter constitutional arrangements. Under such conditions, withholding recognition reflects uncertainty rather than inconsistency.
The Somaliland case, however, has gradually moved beyond that phase.
Since 1991, Somaliland has maintained functioning institutions through successive political transitions. Governments have changed peacefully. Elections have been held repeatedly. Administrative structures have matured. Public authority has been exercised continuously across the territory under its control. What initially appeared to many observers as a provisional political arrangement has gradually evolved into a durable political order.
Time changes the character of political reality.
A political entity that survives for only a few years may reasonably be regarded as temporary. One that demonstrates institutional continuity over more than three decades presents a fundamentally different proposition. Entire generations have lived exclusively under Somaliland’s institutions, while commercial relationships, legal expectations, administrative routines, and systems of governance have become firmly embedded within everyday political life.
The issue is therefore no longer whether Somaliland has demonstrated political durability.
Few observers would now dispute that it has.
The more difficult question is whether indefinite diplomatic non-recognition remains a coherent response to that durability.
The implications extend well beyond Somaliland itself.
When diplomatic recognition persistently lags behind long-established political reality, the consequences become increasingly tangible. Legal uncertainty discourages long-term investment, restricts access to international financial institutions, complicates formal security cooperation, and obliges regional organisations to engage pragmatically with functioning authorities while withholding formal diplomatic recognition.
The costs of prolonged ambiguity are therefore not borne solely by the unrecognised entity.
They increasingly affect the wider regional order.
Somaliland is therefore significant not simply because it seeks recognition, but because it exposes a broader question about the contemporary international system itself.
Can an international order that claims to recognise political reality indefinitely postpone acknowledging one that has demonstrated durability, institutional effectiveness, and governmental continuity for more than three decades?
That question becomes even more compelling when Somaliland is examined within the changing geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.
Over the past two decades, the Horn of Africa has undergone a profound strategic transformation. Regional influence is increasingly determined not simply by military capability or formal sovereignty, but by the ability to organise systems of trade, connectivity, infrastructure, and security. Ports, transport corridors, logistics networks, customs administration, energy interdependence, and institutional reliability have become central instruments of geopolitical influence.
Within this evolving regional environment, Somaliland has assumed growing strategic importance.
Its significance cannot be explained by diplomatic recognition, because widespread recognition has not occurred. Nor can it be understood solely through the historical debate surrounding the 1960 union with Somalia. Increasingly, it derives from the practical functions Somaliland performs within the wider regional system.
This distinction is fundamental.
Geography alone rarely produces geopolitical influence. Location becomes strategically valuable only when it is transformed into infrastructure, institutions, and networks upon which other actors increasingly depend. Strategic geography, in other words, is created not by location itself but by the functions that location enables.
Berbera provides perhaps the clearest illustration of this transformation.
Situated on the Gulf of Aden, adjacent to one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, Berbera has evolved from a national port into an increasingly important regional logistics hub. Investment in port infrastructure, road connectivity, customs modernisation, and commercial facilities has expanded its role well beyond Somaliland’s domestic economy. The Berbera Corridor has similarly strengthened connections with Ethiopia, integrating Somaliland into a wider regional transport network.
Its importance lies not in replacing existing ports.
It lies in expanding regional choice.
Rapidly growing economies rarely rely indefinitely upon a single maritime gateway. Instead, they seek resilience through diversification, competition, redundancy, and flexibility. Multiple transport corridors reduce strategic vulnerability, improve commercial efficiency, and provide alternatives during periods of political or logistical disruption.
This logic is particularly relevant to Ethiopia, whose long-term economic strategy increasingly depends upon diversified and reliable access to international markets. From this perspective, Berbera should not be understood as a substitute for existing corridors but as an additional component of a broader regional logistics architecture capable of strengthening resilience and expanding strategic options.
Somaliland’s strategic importance therefore derives less from controlling regional trade than from increasing the adaptability and resilience of the wider regional system.
The same functional logic applies to maritime security.
The Gulf of Aden remains one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways, linking the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean and carrying a substantial share of global maritime commerce. Safeguarding this route requires more than international naval deployments. It also depends upon capable local institutions able to administer ports, regulate maritime activity, cooperate with external partners, and provide predictable governance along strategically important coastlines.
Over time, Somaliland has demonstrated an increasing capacity to perform precisely these functions.
International actors have repeatedly engaged with Somaliland’s authorities on maritime security, counter-piracy, humanitarian coordination, commercial investment, and regional stability. Such engagement reflects a practical acknowledgement that Somaliland possesses institutions capable of contributing to the effective functioning of the wider regional order.
Yet this practical engagement has not been accompanied by corresponding diplomatic recognition.
Here lies the central paradox.
In practice, Somaliland is increasingly treated as a functional political actor. In law, however, it remains largely excluded from the diplomatic framework normally associated with sustained governmental effectiveness.
Three decades ago, international caution reflected genuine uncertainty. Today, the defining characteristics of Somaliland are no longer uncertainty but continuity. Its institutions have endured, its administrative capacity has expanded, its economy has become more closely integrated into regional markets, and its strategic relevance has grown alongside intensifying competition across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
This does not mean that effective governance or strategic importance automatically justify recognition. Recognition remains one of the most consequential acts available to sovereign states and must always take broader legal, political, and regional considerations into account.
It does suggest, however, that the justification for continued non-recognition becomes progressively more demanding as political reality becomes more firmly established.
Immediately after conflict, governments may reasonably explain why recognition would be premature.
After more than three decades of uninterrupted governance, the more difficult question becomes whether continued non-recognition still reflects prudence—or whether it has become an increasingly difficult position to justify.
Answering that question requires examining the arguments that have sustained international caution for so long.
The persistence of Somaliland’s diplomatic isolation cannot be explained by a single factor. It reflects the interaction of legal caution, regional politics, and strategic calculation. Any serious argument in favour of recognition must therefore engage directly with the reasons why recognition has been withheld for so long.
The most frequently cited concern is the territorial integrity of Somalia.
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, successive governments and international organisations have invested substantial political, financial, and diplomatic resources in rebuilding Somalia as a unified sovereign state. Throughout this period, preserving Somalia’s internationally recognised borders has remained a central objective. From this perspective, recognising Somaliland could appear to undermine decades of state-building efforts before they have reached their intended conclusion.
This concern is neither superficial nor unreasonable.
Territorial integrity remains one of the foundational principles of the contemporary international legal order. It discourages unilateral border revision, reduces the risk of interstate conflict, and provides the legal certainty upon which international stability depends.
The issue, however, is not whether territorial integrity matters.
It unquestionably does.
The more difficult question is whether maintaining a legal position that has diverged from political reality for more than three decades continues to strengthen that principle—or whether, over time, it begins to weaken the credibility of the recognition process itself.
Somaliland presents an unusual challenge because its legal claim does not fit comfortably within the conventional framework of secession.
Supporters of recognition argue that Somaliland emerged as an internationally recognised independent state on 26 June 1960, before voluntarily entering into union with the former Trust Territory of Somalia five days later. They therefore contend that the events of 1991 represented the restoration of an earlier sovereignty rather than the creation of a new state. Critics reject this interpretation and continue to regard Somaliland as an integral part of Somalia’s sovereign territory.
The purpose of this article is not to resolve that legal disagreement.
Rather, it is to observe that the existence of such a disagreement reinforces the need for careful legal analysis rather than political simplification. Somaliland is sufficiently distinctive that it cannot easily be treated as merely another contemporary separatist movement.
A second concern relates to precedent.
Many governments, particularly across Africa, fear that recognising Somaliland could encourage other territorial movements to pursue independence. Given the continent’s history, such caution is understandable. Since the adoption of the principle of uti possidetis juris, preserving inherited colonial boundaries has been regarded as one of the principal safeguards against widespread territorial conflict.
Yet precedent has value only when comparable cases are genuinely comparable.
International law does not require fundamentally different situations to be treated identically. Courts distinguish cases. Governments distinguish cases. International organisations distinguish cases. The identification of exceptional circumstances is therefore not a departure from legal reasoning but an essential feature of it.
Whether Somaliland ultimately satisfies that threshold remains open to legitimate debate.
What is increasingly difficult to sustain, however, is the assumption that its historical circumstances, institutional trajectory, and legal claims are indistinguishable from every other movement seeking independence.
The third concern is geopolitical caution.
Recognition is never a purely legal act. Governments must also weigh their relations with Somalia, the positions of regional organisations, the interests of external powers, and the broader balance of stability in the Horn of Africa. Even governments that maintain constructive relations with Somaliland have frequently concluded that the political costs of recognition outweigh its immediate benefits.
From the perspective of individual governments, such caution is understandable.
Collectively, however, it produces an unintended consequence.
When every state postpones recognition because it expects another to bear the diplomatic costs of acting first, caution gradually becomes inertia. Recognition ceases to evolve alongside developments on the ground and instead becomes increasingly detached from them.
This raises a question that has received remarkably little attention.
What are the costs of continued non-recognition?
For much of the past three decades, policymakers have concentrated on the potential consequences of recognising Somaliland. Considerably less attention has been devoted to the consequences of maintaining indefinite ambiguity.
Those consequences are becoming progressively more apparent.
Legal uncertainty discourages long-term investment. Access to international financial institutions remains constrained. Formal security cooperation becomes unnecessarily complex. Regional infrastructure initiatives continue to operate within a constitutional ambiguity that bears progressively less resemblance to the political realities through which they function.
These costs are not borne by Somaliland alone.
They increasingly affect the wider Horn of Africa by reducing institutional predictability, complicating regional cooperation, and limiting the effectiveness of long-term economic integration.
Recognition should therefore be evaluated not only in terms of the risks associated with changing the status quo, but also in terms of the costs associated with preserving it indefinitely.
After more than three decades, that balance deserves to be reconsidered.
The debate is no longer simply whether recognition carries risks.
It is whether continued non-recognition now carries greater ones.
Conclusion
For more than three decades, the international debate surrounding Somaliland has revolved around a single question: should it be recognised?
This article has argued that this is no longer the most important question.
The more fundamental issue is whether the contemporary international order possesses a coherent standard for determining when enduring political reality should ultimately be reflected in diplomatic recognition. Somaliland does not merely challenge the territorial settlement of the Horn of Africa; it challenges the consistency of the international system’s own approach to recognition.
Recognition was never intended to function as a political reward, nor as an instrument of indefinite diplomatic hesitation. Its purpose is to provide legal certainty by acknowledging political realities that have demonstrated sufficient permanence, effectiveness, and responsibility to participate within international society.
Measured against that purpose, Somaliland presents an exceptional case.
For more than three decades it has exercised effective territorial authority, maintained functioning public institutions, conducted competitive elections, provided internal security, and assumed an increasingly significant role within the political economy of the Horn of Africa. Whatever conclusion one ultimately reaches on recognition, Somaliland today bears little resemblance to a temporary political experiment awaiting resolution.
This does not mean that recognition should be granted lightly, nor does it imply that every unrecognised political entity presents a comparable case. Recognition remains one of the most consequential acts in international relations, carrying profound legal, political, and strategic implications. Exceptional decisions require exceptional evidence.
The argument advanced here is that Somaliland has accumulated precisely such evidence.
Its recognised independence in June 1960, the distinctive legal circumstances surrounding its union with Somalia, its sustained record of effective self-government, and its growing regional significance together distinguish it from most contemporary territorial disputes. To treat Somaliland simply as another secessionist movement is to overlook the historical and legal characteristics that make its case unusually distinctive.
Ultimately, the question is not whether international law should abandon its principles.
It is whether those principles are being applied consistently.
An international order that values effective governance, institutional resilience, regional stability, and the rule of law cannot indefinitely separate those principles from the political realities they were designed to regulate. To do so is not to preserve international order; it is to weaken the credibility upon which that order ultimately depends.
The significance of Somaliland therefore extends beyond one territory on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden.
It raises a broader question about the future of international recognition itself.
If diplomatic recognition exists to acknowledge enduring political realities rather than indefinitely postpone them, then prolonged non-recognition requires a justification at least as persuasive as recognition itself.
After more than three decades of institutional continuity, effective governance, historical distinctiveness, and increasing strategic relevance, the burden of justification has gradually shifted.
The question confronting the international community is therefore no longer whether Somaliland has endured long enough.
It is whether the international system can continue to postpone acknowledging an enduring political reality while maintaining that its practice of recognition remains guided by coherent legal principles rather than prolonged political convenience.
How that question is answered will shape more than Somaliland’s future.
It will shape the credibility of an international order that claims to align legal recognition with political reality.
For if recognition exists to acknowledge enduring political realities, Somaliland is no longer merely a test of statehood. It has become a test of the consistency of the international order itself.
https://saraalsaeed.substack.com/p/the-somaliland-test?r=6shk4n&utm_medium=ios&triedRedirect=true