Somaliland is independent. There is no taking that back. Seventy-five percent of Somalis were born after 1991 and have no direct memory of unity. Over those 35 years, Somaliland developed national institutions and a democratic culture; Somalis, however, remain mired in corruption, violence, and extremism. As Somaliland fiercely defends its sovereignty, Somali Presidents Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud have, for personal profit, made Somalia a de facto colony whose resources and waters Turkey can exploit. Deputy Secretary of State Chris Landau may try to reverse and reject Somaliland sovereignty, but he lives in a fantasy world: Somalilanders will no more rejoin Somalia than Ukrainians will rejoin Russia.
While President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro and his delegation visits the United States to advance Somaliland’s cause in Washington and among international delegations at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Somaliland’s parliament must do more to prepare Somaliland’s legal code to conform with major international treaties and conventions. Somaliland cannot accede to treaties prior to its recognition by the United Nations as a member state if other member-states object—and Somalia, Turkey, and China certainly will. Still, Hargeisa can both signal to the world its seriousness and commitment to rule-of-law and also distinguish itself from Mogadishu if Somaliland’s parliament endorses conventions and treaties that Somalia has joined.
For example, Somalia has not joined the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the so-called Palermo Convention, which criminalizes human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Somaliland already fights such smuggling, but declaring its conformity with the Convention would give it the international credit it deserves at no cost to Somaliland’s sovereignty nor would it run afoul of the conservative elements in Somali society.
Somalia is also not a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Again, joining many of these Hague Conventions would be common-sense, as they represent responsibilities of almost every mainstream state. For example, the Somaliland parliament could endorse the Hague Service Convention which enables the serving of legal documents from abroad into Somaliland. The Hague Evidence Convention allows investigators to take evidence abroad. The Hague Apostille Convention regularizes the authenticating of public documents. The Hague Child Abduction Convention requires the signatories’ cooperation returning children kidnapped by a parent who did not have full custody. While some religious conservatives might object to this, their religious arguments are undercut by the fact that many other majority Muslim states—from Bosnia to Burkina Faso—have joined.
Somalia likewise has not joined the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that allows the Court to try genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. With war criminals from the Isaaq genocide still sheltered in Somalia, the notion that Somalia will join is fantasy, and so Somaliland can distinguish itself. Somali pundits can argue that the United States has also not joined the Rome Statute, Washington’s objections have more to deal with sovereignty concerns against the backdrop of cynical anti-Americanism. Somaliland has more to gain than lose by declaring its intention to join the International Criminal Court on day one of its United Nations accession.
Somaliland’s parliament can also affirm its intention to join separately those treaties like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to which Somalia is a member. This is important because Somali treaty memberships would not migrate with recognition of Somaliland’s ‘secession’ from Somalia. The Clinton administration set out this stance when, against the backdrop of Quebec’s 1995 referendum to become independent, he issued talking points to U.S. diplomats countering Quebecois separatist leaders like Jacques Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard who had argued that an independent Quebec would also be a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The same standard has held true for potential Scottish secession and the status of tripartite Turkey-Syria-Iraq water sharing deals should Kurdistan become independent.
Somaliland should be proud of its parliament. While its elections must be more regular, parliamentarians must think about more than minor tweaks of the existing legal code and more about which treaties Somaliland will join, and ensuring the domestic law makes this possible on day one. Indeed, by doing so, Somaliland can show even its critics that it is more serious and has greater capacity than any other aspirant states, from the Palestinians to the Kurds to New Caledonia’s Kanaks.
About the Author
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.
Dr. Rubin has a PhD and an MA in history from Yale University, where he also obtained a BS in biology.