By Mohamoud Walaaleye
Mohamoud Gaildon’s April 18, 2025, article ( How a US Misstep Can Ignite War in Northern Somalia) reposted X by himslef Friday 9 January 2026, presents a highly partisan, one-sided narrative that selectively distorts history, ignores key facts, and exaggerates supposed US involvement to portray Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition as inherently destructive. While Gaildon frames himself as a neutral Somali-American advocate for unity, his writing consistently aligns with pro-unionist (often Mogadishu-centric) positions that dismiss Somaliland’s legitimate claims to self-determination.
Forget claims of neutrality: Gaildon was among those who played a leading role in inciting the people of Sool and Sanaag to oppose the Somaliland government, while accusing it of fabricated problems. There is a recorded voice of him saying: “I have come 7,000 miles away now to warn you,” referring to a town in the Sanaag region, before asking, “What if the Republic of Somaliland is recognized? What will you do? Decide now and oppose it? Listen to me?”
This piece is less an objective analysis than a polemical attack on Somaliland, riddled with inaccuracies, selective omissions, and inflammatory rhetoric.
Distortion of Somaliland’s Historical and Demographic Basis
Gaildon claims Somaliland’s case rests on a “false premise” and that it represents only the Isaaq clan, dismissing the 1960 merger of British and Italian Somaliland as a “full fusion” with no distinct “Somaliland population.” This is misleading. Somaliland’s restoration of independence in 1991 followed the collapse of Somalia’s central government and was reached through consensus among elders across Somaliland’s territory—including Isaaq and others—after decades of brutal repression under Siad Barre’s regime. That regime disproportionately targeted northern (primarily Isaaq) populations with airstrikes, mass killings, and the destruction of cities like Hargeisa.
Somaliland’s borders are based on the internationally recognized colonial boundaries of the British Somaliland Protectorate—a principle upheld by the African Union (formerly OAU) in its 1964 Cairo Resolution on the inviolability of colonial borders. While clan dynamics are complex, Somaliland has held multiple democratic elections, including peaceful power transitions, and maintains stability in its core areas—standing in sharp contrast to Somalia’s ongoing fragmentation.
Gaildon’s assertion that only the Isaaq support secession ignores documented support or acquiescence from some groups in Awdal, Sool, and elsewhere, and grossly oversimplifies the realities of clan politics in the country.
Misrepresentation of the Las Anod Conflict and SSC-Khaatumo
The article attributes the 2023 Las Anod war directly to the 2022 Somaliland Partnership Act (introduced by US Senators but never enacted into law), claiming it “emboldened” Somaliland to aggress against Harti (Dhulbahante and Warsangeli) clans. This causal link is speculative and unsupported. The conflict stemmed from deliberate incitement of the people of Sool and Sanaag (who are predominantly Harti). There is a recorded statement from the former Speaker of the Puntland Parliament (Dhoobo-Darod) openly admitting in parliament that they were killing anyone working for the Somaliland government from the Dhulbahante clan. In fact, up to 40 officials—both Isaaq and Dhulbahante—who held positions in the Sool region and Las Aanod under the Somaliland administration were killed.
The Somaliland government and its security agencies actively investigated these killings, arresting 35 perpetrators; their cases were completed, and the courts handed down sentences. The Dhulbahante public and politicians were well aware that these killings were part of a conspiracy designed to turn the people and the government against each other. Afterward, groups opposed to Somaliland’s policies—supported by Darod clans, Al-Shabaab terrorists, and Somali federal military forces—launched an open attack.
The outcome of that war is well known. Somaliland’s military was ordered not to launch any offensive attacks on the militias assaulting them, but only to defend themselves. This led to the deaths of many Somaliland officers and soldiers, severely demoralizing the forces. Eventually, when Somaliland troops were instructed to withdraw from Dhulbahante areas, the suffering and losses were significant. However, the militias and Somaliland forces were never equal in strength. If Somaliland had been permitted to mount even a single day of offensive operations, the borders could have been cleared. Instead, mercy was shown to civilians in the city of Las Anod.
While this shifted control on the ground, it does not “nullify” Somaliland’s claims entirely. Disputed territories like parts of Sool and Sanaag remain contested, with sporadic clashes reported even into 2025.
Gaildon ignores that Somaliland’s withdrawal was driven by concern for civilian lives, not US pressure or a decisive militia victory. He portrays the UN Security Council’s call for withdrawal as decisive validation of unionism—yet the UN has not endorsed either secession or unionism unilaterally.
The narrative of a US “tilt” causing the war is overstated. The Partnership Act was merely a feasibility study for cooperation (not recognition), and no major US military support followed. As of early 2026, the US has not recognized Somaliland, despite lobbying efforts and mentions of it in Project 2025 as a strategic hedge against Chinese influence in Djibouti.
Exaggeration of US Recognition Risks
Gaildon warns that US recognition would “mean US acceptance of Somaliland’s ‘right’ to wage war” on SSC-Khaatumo, potentially unleashing “unimaginable destruction” akin to Ethiopia’s Tigray war. This is alarmist hyperbole. No credible evidence suggests that US recognition would fund aggression. Strategic interests (e.g., access to Berbera port) focus on stability and countering rivals like China, not fueling clan warfare.
Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland (the first by any UN member state) led to celebrations in Hargeisa and reciprocal ties, but President Trump publicly hesitated the US from following suit, questioning the issue’s priority. The article’s colonial analogies and attacks on the Heritage Foundation ignore that Somaliland’s quest is driven by local Somalilanders’ desire for self-determination, not external imposition—much like the cases of Eritrea or South Sudan, which Gaildon hypocritically accepts.
Broader Hypocrisy and Selective Morality
Gaildon accuses pro-recognition advocates of ignoring local voices and lacking a “moral compass,” yet his piece shows no engagement with Somaliland perspectives, where millions have built a functioning democracy amid Somalia’s chaos. He calls for US support of Somalia’s “territorial integrity” while downplaying the historical injustices inflicted on then northerners Somalilanders.
In reality, Somaliland’s stability, democratic elections, and economic progress (e.g., Berbera port development) offer a model for the Horn of Africa region. The recognition debate is about geopolitics and self-determination, not “clan-based” destruction.
Gaildon’s alarmism serves a unionist agenda but crumbles under scrutiny. Somaliland’s case endures not because of external plots, but due to the resilience and governance achievements of its people.
https://wardheernews.com/how-a-us-misstep-can-ignite-war-in-northern-somalia/