“The most astonishing thing in the Somali problem is the absence of an Arab position and the ignoring of what is happening in the region, especially Somaliland—a country that has begun turning toward global and regional powers that are not Arab.”
This article titled “Somaliland: Isn’t It an Arab Matter? was written by Hamdy A. Hassan, an Egyptian writer who, in 2009, criticized Arab countries for failing to address the Somaliland issue.
In the past, Egyptians referred to this land as “The Land of the Gods and Fragrance,” while in modern times, the British colonized it for its strategic location in the Horn of Africa, which allowed control over the security of the Gulf of Aden and the sea route to the Indian Ocean—the “pearl in the crown of Britain.” I am referring to the land known as Somaliland, which reclaimed its independence on May 18, 1991, following the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime in Somalia.
Since then, Somaliland has performed all the functions and powers of a sovereign state, even though it has not received formal international recognition. It has a flag, a national anthem, a passport, and institutions of governance and statehood. Somaliland’s leadership has consistently strived to obtain international legitimacy.
Sometimes they engage the West using the language of democracy and human rights, and at other times they remind the United States of Somaliland’s strategic importance in the fight against terrorism, even proposing that the U.S. establish a military base at the port of Berbera.
The surprising thing is the absence of an Arab position—whether official or popular—and the disregard for what is happening in this region, which has led Somaliland to turn toward regional and global non-Arab powers to achieve its goal of international recognition.
So, what is the geopolitical importance of this region? How dangerous is it for Somaliland to turn toward African and global countries that are not Arab? What will be the direction and future political development of this country in light of the internal and external challenges it faces?
Life and Development
Somaliland has significant strategic importance, having inherited the same geographical borders drawn in the 19th century during British colonial rule. The total area is approximately 137,600 km², with a coastline of nearly 850 km. According to 2008 estimates, the population is around five million, mainly from three major clans: Isaaq, Darod, and Dir. Hargeisa is the capital and largest city, while Berbera is the most important commercial port.
Many writers and analysts have described Somaliland’s experience since declaring independence as an example to follow and a success story, as it adopted local solutions based on compromise and national reconciliation.
The most important aspect of Somaliland’s political development since 1991 has been the reconciliation policy adopted by the Somali National Movement (SNM), led by the Isaaq clans. The first reconciliation conference, held in Berbera from February 15 to 27, 1991, aimed to rebuild trust between the Isaaq clans and other northern clans that had worked with Siad Barre’s regime. This conference laid the groundwork for the historic conference in Burao from April 27 to May 18, 1991, where it was decided that Somaliland would separate from the rest of Somalia, reclaiming its independence.
However, the SNM national movement, led by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), transformed into the administration of the nascent state after being tasked with a two-year transitional government. Nevertheless, interim president Abdirahman Tuur showed inability in governing the regions for several reasons, the most important being that some of his party leaders did not believe in the idea of reclamation or feared the consequences of declaring Somaliland’s independence. In addition, internal conflicts emerged within the SNM, sometimes taking the form of fighting and violent disturbances.
After that, other northern clans that were not Isaaq intervened and participated in finding a dialogue-based solution to the problems rooted in conflict. This led to the establishment of the House of Elders (Guurti), which became one of the most important symbols of Somaliland’s political development since 1991. The role of traditional elders and the Guurti structure became a distinctive feature of Somaliland’s political system.
The 1993 Borama National Reconciliation Conference, which lasted five months and involved nearly 500 people—including politicians, elders, merchants, religious scholars, and civil society organizations—led to a peaceful transfer of power. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who had previously served as Prime Minister of Somalia before the 1969 military coup, became president.
The 2001 constitution approved a hybrid system combining traditional clan structures with modern democracy. After Egal’s death in 2002, the 2003 presidential election took place, in which Dahir Riyale Kahin won by a very narrow margin of just eighty votes out of half a million voters. Despite this, Somaliland still faces major challenges, such as delays in presidential elections, with the Guurti arguing that the delay is necessary to ensure transparency and fairness in upcoming elections.
The Strategic Position of the Country (Geopolitics of Somaliland)
Somaliland has presented a different image from the failure and suffering associated with the broader Somali issue. It is one of the success stories in East Africa, having relied on internal solutions for its peace and state-building without foreign intervention. It is worth noting that Somaliland’s diaspora support, which remits over $500 million annually, plays a significant role.
In contrast to the south, all national reconciliation conferences in southern Somalia came with sponsorship and funding from external parties, receiving support from international organizations and donors. This led to significant external influence on the direction and outcomes of national reconciliation in southern Somalia. In contrast, Somaliland has always prioritized internal reconciliation and building domestic trust.
Somaliland’s location on the Gulf of Aden and its connection to Red Sea security has caused some countries to ignore the lack of international recognition and deal directly with the Hargeisa administration. The port of Berbera has become a strategic corridor, leading to U.S. research suggesting that recognizing Somaliland could help address the problems in southern Somalia. The discovery of oil also strengthens the aspiration for independence.
The Arabs and Handling the Somaliland Issue
The official Arab position is limited to general statements and support for Somali unity, rejecting anything seen as secession. This reflects a systematic Arab failure to protect their national security, especially in sensitive areas like the Horn of Africa.
Arab civil society has also failed to play the humanitarian role it could have in Somaliland, such as in education, healthcare, and poverty alleviation.
On the other hand, Ethiopia has strong economic and diplomatic ties with Somaliland, using the port of Berbera and maintaining an official embassy in Hargeisa. Ethiopia’s apparent intention is not to want a strong, unified Somali state.
Visions and Future Possibilities
There are two contradictory examples that emerged from Somalia after 1991: one is Somaliland’s experience of peace and state-building, and the other is the chaos and conflict in the rest of Somalia. When compared, Somaliland faces major challenges such as weak state institutions, lack of international recognition, border disputes with Puntland, and election difficulties. Therefore, three possible future scenarios can be predicted:
- Obtaining international recognition, though difficult given its impact on the rest of Africa.
- The return of conflicts and wars, especially if the Puntland dispute escalates.
- Continuation of the current situation, which is the most realistic given the existing circumstances.
This article was translated in 2009 by Abdullahi Beershiya and published in the Jamhuuriya newspaper in Hargeisa.
Dr. Hamdi Abdel Rahman is an Egyptian writer, academic, and political analyst specializing in African affairs and geopolitics, particularly the Horn of Africa region.
He holds a PhD in political science and is recognized as an expert on African political dynamics, regional security, and Egypt’s relations with Africa. His work often focuses on issues like state-building, conflicts, water disputes (e.g., the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam), and Somalia’s fragmentation, including the case of Somaliland.
In 2009, he authored an influential article critiquing the Arab world’s neglect of the Somaliland issue.