By: Abdi Halim M. Musa Date: August 22, 2025
Introduction
Former U.S. Ambassador Larry André’s recent commentary, “Somaliland Status Policy Review: Proceed Carefully, Consult Widely, Consider Facts” (André, 2025), offers a superficially balanced but ultimately misleading assessment of Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of international recognition. While presented as cautious policy advice, the article reproduces entrenched talking points from Somalia’s federal government, omits essential historical and legal facts, and downplays Somaliland’s democratic legitimacy and strategic value to the United States.
This rebuttal seeks to correct key inaccuracies, expose conflicts of interest underpinning André’s arguments, and present a rigorously documented case for Somaliland’s rightful recognition as a sovereign state. In doing so, it emphasizes Somaliland’s unique history of independence, the illegality of the 1960 union, the doctrine of state continuity, the African Union’s own findings, and the overwhelming democratic mandate expressed by the people of Somaliland. It also addresses the geopolitical stakes of recognition, particularly for U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa and the broader Indo-Pacific strategy.
The purpose of this rebuttal is not merely academic. It is both corrective and prescriptive. Corrective, because it sets the record straight where Ambassador André has misrepresented facts. Prescriptive, because it calls on U.S. policymakers to recognize Somaliland on the basis of law, legitimacy, and strategic partnership.
1. Historical Legitimacy and the Myth of Voluntary Union
Ambassador André implies that Somaliland voluntarily unified with Somalia in July 1960. This claim is historically inaccurate and legally unsustainable. Somaliland attained full independence from Great Britain on June 26, 1960, recognized by at least 35 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Egypt, and the Soviet Union (Hess, 1966; Farley, 2010). Within those four days, Somaliland exchanged diplomatic notes, signed treaties, and operated as a sovereign state in the international system.
The subsequent “union” with the former Italian Somalia on July 1, 1960 was not based on any ratified treaty. Somaliland’s legislature passed an Act of Union, but Somalia’s legislature failed to reciprocate. Instead, Somalia passed its own Atto di Unione with materially different terms. No joint ratification occurred, no binding treaty was signed, and crucially, the arrangement was never registered with the United Nations under Article 102 of the UN Charter, which requires all treaties to be deposited for validity (UN, 1945).
This absence of legal formalization means that Somaliland was effectively annexed rather than voluntarily merged. International law recognizes that a treaty not ratified by both parties and not filed with the UN cannot establish a binding union (Shaw, 2017). Thus, Somaliland’s 1991 re-declaration of independence was not secession, but a restoration of sovereignty unlawfully interrupted in 1960.
2. Legal Doctrine: State Continuity, Not Secession
Ambassador André characterizes Somaliland as a breakaway region, implying its case is akin to South Sudan or Eritrea. This framing misrepresents international law. Somaliland’s claim rests on the principle of state continuity, not secession.
The doctrine of state continuity holds that sovereignty persists even if interrupted by annexation, provided it was never lawfully surrendered. Historical parallels include the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), which retained legal sovereignty throughout Soviet annexation (Talmon, 1999). The international community treated them as occupied, not dissolved, and promptly recognized their restored independence in 1991.
By the same reasoning, Somaliland—recognized in 1960, never lawfully merged, and unlawfully absorbed—remains the legal successor to the State of Somaliland. Its 1991 declaration was thus a constitutional act of reclaiming prior independence, not an act of separatism.
This distinction matters. Secessionists seek to create new states; Somaliland seeks recognition of its already existing and once-recognized sovereignty. International law offers far stronger grounds for Somaliland than for most new states admitted since the Cold War.
3. The African Union’s 2005 Fact-Finding Mission
Ambassador André urges deference to the African Union (AU) but conspicuously omits the AU’s own most authoritative assessment of Somaliland’s case. In 2005, the AU dispatched a Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland, led by then-Deputy Chair Patrick Mazimhaka.
The mission’s report concluded:
“The case of Somaliland is unique and self-justified in African political history. It does not create a precedent for other secessionist movements” (AU Mission Report, 2005).
The AU recognized that Somaliland’s borders correspond exactly to those inherited from colonial rule—consistent with the principle of uti possidetis juris that underpins African territorial integrity (Herbst, 2000). It also commended Somaliland’s democratic stability and noted that its case merited special treatment outside the usual AU framework.
The AU’s failure to follow through on this recommendation reflects political caution, not substantive rejection. The report remains a landmark acknowledgment that Somaliland’s case stands apart from all other African territorial disputes.
4. Democratic Mandate and Popular Sovereignty
André downplays Somaliland’s democratic legitimacy. Yet the record is clear: Somaliland has repeatedly demonstrated popular sovereignty through free and fair processes.
In May 2001, Somaliland conducted a constitutional referendum in which 97.1% of voters endorsed independence and the draft constitution. Observers from the Initiative and Referendum Institute confirmed the referendum was “reasonably free and credible” (IRI Report, 2001).
Since then, Somaliland has held seven multiparty elections, including peaceful transfers of power in 2002, 2010, 2017 and 2024. These elections were monitored by international missions, including the UK-based Progressio and the University of Pennsylvania’s Carter Center affiliates, who noted high levels of transparency relative to regional standards (Walls & Kibble, 2010).
This democratic record surpasses Somalia’s federal government, which has never held a one-person-one-vote national election. Somaliland’s legitimacy derives directly from the will of its people, consistent with Article 1(2) of the UN Charter and UN Resolution 1514 (XV) on self-determination.
5. Strategic Value to the United States and Global Stability
Ambassador André minimizes Somaliland’s geostrategic importance. In fact, Somaliland offers the United States a uniquely reliable partner in a contested region.
● Geopolitical Location. Somaliland’s coast borders the Gulf of Aden, adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which nearly 10% of global trade passes (CSIS, 2021). Control and stability in this corridor are critical to U.S. and allied maritime security.
● Counterterrorism. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has maintained a firm security environment, excluding al-Shabaab and other extremist groups from its territory (Menkhaus, 2014). This makes it a stable platform for U.S. counterterrorism cooperation.
● Democratic Governance. Somaliland’s political institutions are comparatively accountable and transparent. This aligns with U.S. values and distinguishes Somaliland as a democratic ally, not merely a security client.
● Strategic Partnerships. Somaliland has already demonstrated willingness to cooperate with U.S. allies. In 2020, it established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, defying Chinese pressure. This bold act illustrates strategic alignment with Washington’s Indo-Pacific priorities.
Recognition of Somaliland would consolidate a democratic partner, strengthen U.S. presence in the Red Sea corridor, and counter adversarial influence from China, and extremist networks.
6. Political Bias and Conflict of Interest
Perhaps most concerning is Ambassador André’s own conflict of interest. Recent filings under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) reveal his advisory roles with Hormuud Telecom and Salaam Somali Bank (FARA, 2025). These entities are financially and politically aligned with Somalia’s federal government and have historically resisted Somaliland’s independence.
Hormuud Telecom and Salaam Somalia Bank operate under Somalia’s regulatory framework and are deeply embedded in Mogadishu’s political economy.
By serving these institutions, Ambassador André is not an impartial analyst. His commentary reads less like an objective policy brief and more like a proxy defense of Mogadishu’s position. For U.S. policymakers, this raises questions of credibility and transparency.
7. Somaliland’s Achievements and Institutional Strength
Contrary to claims of fragility, Somaliland has built a functioning state apparatus under conditions of non-recognition. Its achievements include:
● Seven competitive elections with peaceful transitions of power.
● Independent judiciary and legislature with constitutional oversight.
● Currency and central bank, operating independently of Somalia’s financial system.
● Effective border and security forces, recognized for curbing piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
● Diplomatic representation from the UK, Ethiopia, Taiwan, Djibouti, and others.
● Public service provision, including a growing education sector and one of the Horn’s most vibrant media landscapes (Harper, 2012).
Moreover, Somaliland has attracted significant diaspora remittances, estimated at $1.5 billion annually, sustaining its economy and financing grassroots development (World Bank, 2020).
These achievements demonstrate statehood capacity. Recognition would unlock international financing and multilateral support, enabling Somaliland to consolidate these gains further.
8. International Precedent and Legal Clarity
Ambassador André warns that recognizing Somaliland could set a precedent for other separatist movements. This mischaracterizes the issue.
Somaliland is not redrawing colonial borders. Its territory corresponds exactly to the State of Somaliland (1960), which enjoyed brief but legitimate independence. The African Union itself confirmed the uniqueness of this case (AU, 2005).
International precedents also favor Somaliland. The Baltic states were recognized in 1991 not as new states, but as restored sovereigns after illegal annexation. Kosovo was recognized in 2008 despite strong Serbian objections, based on its distinct history and inability to reintegrate into Serbia (ICJ, 2010).
Somaliland’s case is even clearer: it meets all Montevideo Convention criteria—defined territory, permanent population, functioning government, and capacity for international relations (Montevideo, 1933). It is not secessionist but restorative.
Conclusion
Ambassador Larry André’s call for caution is not grounded in historical accuracy, legal rigor, or strategic logic. It reflects a biased alignment with Somalia’s federal government and its financial allies.
By contrast, Somaliland’s case is:
● Legally sound, grounded in state continuity and international law.
● Historically justified, reflecting its 1960 independence and unlawful annexation.
● Democratically mandated, endorsed by 97% in referendum and sustained by six elections.
● Strategically beneficial, offering the U.S. a stable ally at a global maritime chokepoint.
Recognition of Somaliland would honor international law, reward democratic governance, and advance U.S. security interests. It would not create a precedent for secession but rather correct a historical anomaly.
The time has come for U.S. policymakers to move beyond outdated narratives and embrace reality. Somaliland is a sovereign state in all but name. Recognition would acknowledge facts on the ground, strengthen democratic allies, and stabilize one of the world’s most volatile regions.
Author Bio:
Abdi Halim M. Musa
Political and Economic Analyst | Secretary General, Somaliland Intellectual Forum | Former Deputy Minister of Commerce, Somaliland
E-mail: halimusa4@gmail.com