Last week, a US Congressman introduced the ‘Somaliland Independence Act’ to congress, potentially bringing Washington one step closer to becoming the first to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state and ending the breakaway territory’s decades-long quest for full independence.
If it goes ahead, recognition would undoubtedly have huge implications for regional geopolitics, affecting not only Somalia, but Ethiopia, Djibouti, and regional powers across the Red Sea.
Daniel Worku, a researcher whose work focuses on the intersection of peacebuilding, statehood, and secessionist movements in the Horn of Africa, is among those keeping a close eye on the unfolding developments. An expert in the region’s geopolitics, Daniel holds a graduate degree in Peace and Security Studies from Addis Ababa University and is currently serving as an academic fellow at ETH Zurich’s Center for International Conflict Mediation and Negotiation.
His ongoing research project, titled ‘State Secession Movements in the Horn of Africa: Armed and Non-Armed Struggles’, focuses on comparative case studies of South Sudan and Somaliland.
Daniel also lectures at the Federal TVET Institute in the Department of Social Science, following previous roles as a lecturer and researcher at Jimma University’s College of Law and Governance. In this interview with The Reporter‘s Nardos Yoseph, he shares his insights on the high stakes surrounding Somaliland’s recognition, Ethiopia’s diplomatic balancing act, and the broader implications for peace and power dynamics in the region. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: If the United States formally recognizes Somaliland, how do you anticipate it will reshape geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa—particularly in relation to Ethiopia’s foreign policy and Red Sea access?
Daniel Worku: When responding to this question, it’s helpful to begin from the historical context. Since late 1991, Ethiopia has viewed Somaliland as a self-declared, de facto state—particularly one that has tried to function independently. Since 1994, it has had its own currency and flag. However, it has not received official recognition as a sovereign country from either the African Union or other regional and international organizations.
Coming to the main question: if the United States moves toward recognizing Somaliland as an independent state, it will carry significant weight—essentially the lion’s share—in legitimizing that status. This is especially true because when a new state is trying to stand on its own, US recognition often plays a decisive role. That is why the Somaliland issue remains under close watch.
For example, consider Kosovo. The first country to recognize Kosovo’s independence was the United States. Similarly, in Asia, looking at what happened with Pakistan, the US has historically played a leading role in endorsing statehood in such contested cases.
There was even widespread anticipation during the Trump administration that Somaliland might finally gain recognition. Many had high hopes that Somaliland would be granted statehood recognition under Trump. But in my view, those hopes were not fully realized.
Still, gradually—and this can be stated with certainty—even if it hasn’t yet received full international recognition, the question of Somaliland’s statehood is no longer in limbo. It’s an unfolding matter.
Can you explain why Somaliland’s role and significance in the political and security dynamics of East Africa are critical?
The reason is, first of all, that Somaliland is among the few in East Africa with a consistent and relatively peaceful track record of power transitions. In terms of precedent, especially when we look at the broader East African region, Somaliland has practical experience with democratic processes. Despite some failures and challenges, they have gradually institutionalized democratic culture through peaceful and relatively stable transitions of power.
It is rare in this region to find a functioning state within one on the verge of destabilization—Somaliland is a functioning entity within what is considered a highly volatile fragile state, Somalia. So, Somaliland’s practical experience with democracy carries intrinsic value—not only for promoting stability in East Africa, but also as a case worth recognizing in and of itself.
Beyond that, Somaliland is also seen as playing a significant role in the broader counterterrorism efforts—particularly with regard to Al-Shabaab and the persistent insecurity in East Africa and the Red Sea corridor. Issues like maritime insecurity and terrorism that are frequently raised in relation to the Red Sea can be more effectively addressed if Somaliland becomes part of the formal architecture of counterterrorism. In this sense, Somaliland offers a strategic alternative—like Djibouti—in the fight against extremism, should it gain formal international recognition.
Somaliland’s recognition is not just a symbolic act; it could create a valuable foothold for many countries in the region’s long-standing counterterrorism operations. That makes it one of the major justifications for its recognition.
Moreover, from the perspective of long-term regional integration or structured cooperation, Somaliland’s international recognition could come with additional benefits for East Africa. As I noted earlier, if more countries start recognizing Somaliland, its relevance to the geopolitical landscape could shift significantly.
Can Somaliland as a state contribute further? Yes—it could enhance the counterterrorism campaign once again, particularly in alignment with major powers like the United States. Especially in America’s broader efforts to counter Al-Shabaab, and in securing maritime spaces and combating piracy, Somaliland can become either a partner or an operational hub.
Of course, these things often unfold behind closed doors. We can’t ignore that the recent Memorandum of Understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland triggered major tension with Mogadishu. That’s a reminder. And even now, renewed tensions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa cannot be ruled out. But to this extent, Somaliland is certainly becoming a significant player in the region.
Given the recent introduction to US Congress of a bill proposing recognition of Somaliland, how does this development affect the legal and political standing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland?
When it comes to Ethiopia, we recall that an MoU was signed with Somaliland to gain access to a port, but most notably to a naval base. However, this memorandum of understanding has not been legally formalized; meaning, it has not been legally approved by the Ethiopian House of Peoples’ Representatives. As is known, it may be a de facto state but Somaliland itself has a democratically elected parliament and administration. Still, the MoU has never been legalized by either Ethiopia or Somaliland.
Therefore, there has not been much distance or progress made in this regard. So now, I don’t know what could be created regarding Ethiopia’s interest in a naval base and alternative port. Whether this or Somaliland’s necessity, whether it is welcomed or rejected, Ethiopia has both given and not given awareness. Ethiopia has neither officially fully embraced nor completely rejected the agreement.
Meanwhile, other countries are making increasing investments in Somaliland. We recall that the European Union has made significant investments there. Turkey and other European countries have huge embassies in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital. As I previously mentioned, the European Union is making major wealth investments, and has been doing so quietly for the past several years.
The Hargeisa government is working hard to strengthen itself and to better organize government structures, which is an effort silently well supported by the EU. When we look at all these developments, from my perspective, considering the current trend in East Africa, if Somaliland obtains recognition of its statehood, it seems likely that it would become an additional force for peace and security in the region.
How might the global balance of influence shift if the US recognizes Somaliland? Would other powers follow suit?
When we talk about the balance of influence, at this moment, one actor that might find the situation unfavorable is China. Given its firm stance on the Taiwan issue, China is generally opposed to recognizing breakaway regions or encouraging countries that emerge from secessionist movements. It does not support such developments.
However, looking at global trends, even though countries like Pakistan have formed under different historical contexts, China has not been at the forefront of encouraging such processes. Still, if the United States moves first and grants recognition, others are likely to follow. And especially when strategic interests like access to military bases are at play, the European Union might begin investing ahead of time—as they did with Kosovo.
From a political and historical perspective, this is not unprecedented. What happened in Kosovo is now being mirrored in Somaliland. Europeans, in particular, often work to solidify their own domestic political standing before acting externally. They won’t be the first to give recognition—but they do start laying the groundwork early, strengthening internal structures and quietly preparing. So in that sense, China may find this unfavorable—not because it supports secession, but because of the shift in global alignments. Beyond China, countries like Egypt may also weigh in.
What would Ethiopia’s diplomatic posture look like in such a scenario? Do you foresee a major regional confrontation?
Within this complex environment, Ethiopia is likely to opt for silent diplomacy or pragmatic diplomacy. Rather than being the first to recognize or trigger events prematurely, Ethiopia would likely assess and act in accordance with broader global movements—regional, geopolitical, and strategic. So I don’t see this creating an immediate or major conflict.
When the US moves, others tend to follow. At this point in time, Somaliland’s geopolitical relevance is quite significant. Djibouti’s strategic monopoly is starting to weaken, which creates an opening. Other countries are exploring Somaliland as an option—for military bases or new maritime routes.
Given all this, I don’t see a shift strong enough to drastically alter the balance of power. Take Russia, for instance: even though it has its own interests, the consequences of its actions in Ukraine have been massive. In the Middle East, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia may have their own interests, especially Saudi Arabia, which is reportedly among those sympathetic to Somaliland’s recognition. Turkey might also not be pleased by such developments.
But regardless of what these actors want, the lion’s share of global influence still lies with the US. So I don’t think this situation will lead to open conflict between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, nor do I believe it will dangerously destabilize the region.
From your perspective as a researcher, how likely is it that recognition could destabilize Somalia’s internal cohesion, and what would the ripple effects be for Jubaland and Puntland?
The Somali government cannot be described as a particularly strong state. Its structure and institutions are not robust enough to contain such a shock. Unless foreign actors deliberately exploit the situation to sabotage it, I don’t think recognition alone would have a significant immediate effect. However, should Somaliland gain formal recognition, it could trigger questions elsewhere.
Somalia is already fragmented in many ways. For instance, just four or five months ago, Jubaland, though technically a regional state, was behaving in many ways like a de facto sovereign entity. If Somaliland is recognized, similar claims could emerge from other regions. That said, regions like Jubaland and Puntland are not nearly as institutionally developed or politically mature as Somaliland.
Somaliland has, since around 1995, introduced its own currency, flown its own flag, and established structures that mirror an independent state. Other Somali regions have not laid such groundwork. So, this is not simply a matter of ambition—it’s about capacity.
Still, I believe formal recognition of Hargeisa’s administration could further undermine Somalia’s already fragile federal structure. The Somali government relies heavily on external support and does not stand firmly on its own. Some regional states at times even defy the federal government, with clan-based allegiances often shaping federal-regional dynamics. The result is a highly complex and fragmented system, which makes it harder to build a unified, consolidated Somali state. Recognition of Somaliland could severely threaten that process.
How might Eritrea interpret a US-Somaliland axis—especially if it results in deeper Ethiopian naval ambitions? Could that escalate tensions on the Red Sea coast?
In the eyes of Mogadishu, Egypt, and Eritrea, Ethiopia is increasingly viewed as a common adversary. That’s the political reality we’re dealing with. This is precisely why Ethiopia must tread very carefully in its foreign policy engagement regarding Somaliland. Whether recognition is granted in response to US signals or emerges from Ethiopia’s own strategic calculus, it must be approached with full awareness of the broader geopolitical ripple effects.
Sometimes, what appears beneficial on the surface may carry hidden risks. For example, Somalia’s inability to stand on its own, without relying on the Ethiopian military for counterinsurgency support, means that any disruption in the current arrangement could backfire. That vulnerability makes Ethiopia’s role both an opportunity and a potential liability.
If Ethiopia is to follow Washington’s lead—whether in recognition or broader alignment—it must do so with extreme caution. The reason is simple: rival states—those that see Ethiopia as an obstacle—will likely use Somaliland or Somalia itself as entry points to exert pressure and advance their interests.
The problem isn’t just about how and when these countries make their move—it’s also about Somalia’s inability to independently defend itself. That, in turn, compels Ethiopia to monitor the evolving dynamics very closely and manage the political outcomes of emerging alliances.
Diplomacy must be handled with precision. The balance of power must be constantly assessed. Remember what happened around 2007: at that time, Ethiopia’s alignment with the US counterterrorism agenda in East Africa actually worked in its favor. The reason? Ethiopia’s and America’s interests converged in confronting the threat posed by the union of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. That moment of shared interest strengthened Ethiopia’s position.
The point is this: great power decisions, especially in volatile regions like the Horn, always have cascading effects. Ethiopia cannot afford to treat them lightly. It must work alongside global actors when interests align, but never lose sight of its own national interest. Reading the shifts in power—both regional and global—and moving accordingly is no longer optional. It’s a strategic necessity.
If the US chooses not to recognize Somaliland, how do you see Hargeisa repositioning itself diplomatically—towards China, the UAE, or possibly Russia?
Somaliland already maintains strong relations with the European Union. The progress we’ve seen in terms of internal peace and a relatively advanced democratic culture wasn’t achieved in isolation—it’s also the result of substantial EU investment aimed at strengthening Somaliland’s institutions. In many ways, it’s similar to the level of investment the EU has made in Kosovo.
As for China, I don’t think Somaliland will pivot toward Beijing. Hargeisa hosts a Taiwanese embassy—something that speaks volumes. Given China’s well-known stance on Taiwan, it’s unlikely Somaliland would draw closer to Beijing even if US recognition doesn’t materialize. Perhaps China might pursue a naval base in Somaliland, but I don’t foresee a deeply strategic relationship forming.
Instead, I believe the Gulf countries—particularly those with oil wealth—will continue to expand their influence. Their diplomatic and economic involvement in the Horn has been steadily growing. Turkey, for instance, is not particularly eager to recognize Somaliland’s statehood. But under Erdoğan, Ankara is reviving the historical Ottoman-era influence in the region.
Saudi Arabia has also played a notable role—for example, it was instrumental in the founding of the Somaliland National Movement. But the biggest player by far is the United Arab Emirates. The UAE, through its logistics giant DP World, faced challenges with Djibouti over port deals and has since redirected major investment to Somaliland. This is part of a broader strategy to sideline Djibouti by helping establish a viable government in Hargeisa.
Diplomatically, the UAE and EU have the strongest ties with Somaliland. I believe both are well-positioned to facilitate Somaliland’s recognition process, should the US opt not to lead. As for Russia, I don’t think a pivot in that direction is likely. Russia simply doesn’t have an active enough role—whether diplomatically or economically—to be a meaningful player in this context.