By Jalene Tesfaye
For decades, Somalia has dominated discussions about the Horn of Africa’s political and security issues. Nonetheless, Somaliland, the self-proclaimed but unrecognized country in the north, has become the focus of global interest. The change is not coincidental. Somaliland’s relative stability, geostrategic location on one of the world’s busiest maritime routes, and potential as a regional economic and security partner have made it an appealing option for the United States. As conversations about its recognition gather momentum, the question becomes what recognition, or prolonged struggle for recognition, implies for the region’s future.
Somaliland’s international prominence has increased particularly in Washington. The Trump administration showed early signs of a desire to engage more directly with Somaliland. This was part of a larger reevaluation of US regional aims. Due to the ongoing instability in Somalia and the global competition for influence in the Red Sea region, the United States is searching for new allies that can provide stability and strategic value. Despite flaws, Somaliland is a valuable ally because of its democratic administration, independent security system, and operational government.
Ethiopia’s stakes are similarly substantial. As a landlocked country, ensuring dependable access to the sea is an essential concern. The January 2024 deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which grants Ethiopia economic and naval access to the Berbera port, represents a major change in regional alliances. This decision decreases Ethiopia’s dependency on Djibouti and establishes Somaliland as an important commercial gateway. Ethiopia’s relation to Somaliland, however, involves more than just economics. It is a determined foreign policy decision aimed at creating a stable regional environment in which Ethiopia can safeguard its interests without being vulnerable to unexpected regional dynamics, notably those involving Somalia’s fragile federal government.
Somaliland as a U.S.-China Battleground.
Somaliland’s geopolitical prominence has prompted comparisons to Taiwan, with both the United States and China seeing it as a strategic tool in their rivalry. Just as Beijing is pressuring governments to cut ties with Taiwan, China has allegedly cautioned Somaliland against retaining connections with Taiwan—a warning denied by Somaliland’s Foreign Minister. Over the last year, Beijing has increased pressure on Hargeisa by backing dissidents, strengthening links with Mogadishu, and reaffirming its “One Somalia” policy.
China has two primary concerns. First, its only foreign military station is in Djibouti, and a possible US or Taiwanese presence in Somaliland—just across the Red Sea—would directly challenge its regional military footprint. Second, Western countries’ recognition of Somaliland may open the path for additional breakaway territories, weakening China’s territorial claims. In response, the United States sees an opportunity to counterbalance Beijing by strengthening ties with Somaliland, possibly offering security alliances or even recognition to establish a strategic footing.
For Somaliland, the great-power competition poses challenges and opportunities. While cooperation with the United States may have economic and diplomatic benefits, it also entails triggering Chinese retaliation whether through proxy destabilization or economic pressure. Meanwhile, Mogadishu’s alliance with Beijing hinders Somaliland’s path to recognition, since China may encourage Somalia to exacerbate hostilities. The long-term relations between Somaliland and Somalia might change profoundly if Washington or Beijing formally recognizes Hargeisa, perhaps sparking a chain reaction of diplomatic realignments across the Horn.
Ethiopia’s interest is tied to the competition. While Addis Ababa benefits from access to Berbera and Somaliland’s stability, it must also handle China’s expanding influence in Somalia and Djibouti. If the United States recognizes Somaliland, Beijing may put pressure on Ethiopia to rethink its partnership or suffer economic consequences. The entire region, which is already an arena for Gulf rivalries, may become much more fragmented if global forces choose sides.
Recognition of Somaliland: Implications for the Horn of Africa
The formal recognition of Somaliland will greatly impact the region’s economic and security situation. Somaliland currently struggles to attract substantial international investment and gain access to global financial institutions due to its unrecognized status. Recognition would unlock economic potential by promoting infrastructure development, commerce, and regional integration. A peaceful and prosperous Somaliland might also balance Somalia’s chronic instability, providing an example of government and security for the entire Horn of Africa.
Somaliland’s strategic location in the Gulf of Aden makes it an important partner in maritime security and counter-terrorism operations. With piracy, smuggling, and extremist organizations like al-Shabaab taking advantage of regional instability, a recognized Somaliland, backed by the United States and its allies, could serve as a critical security center. The U.S. military’s desire to build a presence there demonstrates its importance in protecting shipping channels and conflict threats. A partnership like this would strengthen Western attempts to stabilize the Red Sea, which is becoming increasingly crucial for the world.
Ethiopia and the United States have a strong strategic interest in Somaliland’s prosperity. Access to Berbera Port decreases Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti while strengthening its economic security. Somaliland is an essential ally for Washington in a region where China, Russia, and Gulf nations compete for influence. The UAE’s investments in Berbera, as well as competing Gulf governments’ assistance for Mogadishu, emphasize the geopolitical implications.
The recognition of Somaliland, or the continued dispute over it, will have a major impact on the Horn of Africa, especially as internal crises, conflicts, and the potential of spillover escalate. The engagement of global rivals risks exacerbating regional differences, particularly since Somalia remains politically weak and tensions exist among neighboring governments. External interests might complicate an already unstable security situation, making stability difficult to accomplish.
Ethiopia has an important part in this dynamic since its demand for safe sea access has led to tighter ties with Somaliland. However, this approach may strain relations with China, which has a large economic presence in Ethiopia and supports Somalia’s territorial ambitions. If mismanaged, the situation might exacerbate regional instability, but an organized diplomatic strategy that involves regional collaboration and economic integration could reduce threats. If managed effectively, Somaliland’s rise as a regional actor has the potential to boost economic and security possibilities rather than exacerbate tensions.