How did the unrecognized state of Somaliland become the focus of clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as Turkey and Greece? And what does Egypt want with it?
Source: Ha’aretz
On the night of July 19, a drone swooped down over Tel Aviv’s beaches, killing Evgeny Freder in his sleep not far from the U.S. embassy building. Israel’s defense establishment was caught with its pants down – nobody thought that a small, slow, lugubrious aircraft, launched over 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) away, from Yemen, would be able to evade Israel’s advanced air defense systems, fly around Tel Aviv, kill one person, wound 10 others and cause panic.
The attack demonstrated the operational capabilities of Yemen’s Houthis who, ever since the Arab Spring, have become a well-financed and well-armed proxy for Iran in its conflicts with Saudi Arabia and Israel. It also forced Israel’s defense establishment – which until then had left the U.S. and Britain to come up with a military response to the Houthis – to realize that Israel must find its own solutions to defeat the Yemeni threat.
Israel also realized it will not be able to send its fighter jets on long, expensive raids on Yemen every time a $20,000 Houthi drone explodes inside the country – especially given that the Houthis are believed to have one of the world’s largest stockpiles of drones. Therefore, Israel has had to seek out more efficient alternatives.
In the late 19th century, Britain and Italy gained control on the Somali sphere, setting up British Somaliland – which corresponds to modern-day Somaliland – as a protectorate.
One such alternative involves a small, remote state, bereft of international recognition, that over the last year has become the arena for an explosive regional struggle, rife with geopolitical interests. That place is Somaliland – a territory ruled by the Muslim Issa clan, that seceded from the mother-state of Somalia in 1991 and declared independence without international guarantees. Ever since then it has been trying to gain recognition from countries while fortifying itself against regional threats, primarily Somalia, which seeks to regain control of the territory.
International law recognizes Somaliland only as an autonomous district within Somalia, and until 2024 not a single country recognized it as an independent country, with the exception of Taiwan, itself an unrecognized state.
This has significant economic implications. Somaliland cannot take part in international trade, nor can it get financial aid from organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and has to function as an autarkic economy. For that reason, one field that is thriving in the territory is maritime piracy.
The demand for Somaliland’s independence harks back to the colonial age in Africa. In the late 19th century, Britain and Italy gained control on the Somali sphere, setting up British Somaliland – which corresponds to modern-day Somaliland – as a protectorate. In WWII, British forces occupied Italian Somaliland, then part of Mussolini’s fascist Italy, uniting the two territories into one state that operated as a political unit within the British empire. In 1960, united Somaliland gained independence and the republic of Somalia was established. The collapse of the country’s central government in 1991 and the raging civil war led to the secession of the territory of Somaliland from the mother-state.
Unlike Somalia, which has been plagued for decades by murderous civil wars and was ruled for part of this period by Islamic militias, primarily Al-Shabaab, Somaliland, with its 6.2 million inhabitants, has managed to consolidate a functioning democratic regime, including fair and free elections and stable democratic institutions, without bloodshed. The anarchy typical of Mogadishu, the capitol of Somalia, stands in sharp contrast to the peacefulness of Hargeisa, the capitol of Somaliland.
It may be said that Israel and Somaliland are similar in two essential ways: They are both small, vulnerable democracies, situated in areas rife with authoritarian regimes and murderous wars. Also, both are suffering from sovereignty issues vis-à-vis the international community, and both have enemies that seek to destroy them.
Ethiopia’s move
On October 17, the pro-Qatari news website Middle East Monitor reported that Israel secretly approached Somaliland, situated across the Gulf of Aden from the Yemeni city of Aden, with a proposal that would serve both parties: Israel will set up a military base in Somaliland that will allow it to attack and deter Houthi targets, in return for formal recognition of the country and financial investments in it.
According to the report, which relies on diplomatic sources, the United Arab Emirates is mediating between the two countries, and has not only convinced Somaliland to allow the construction of the military base, but will also finance it. The UAE, a signatory to the 2020 Abraham Accords with Israel, has a clear vested interest in such a deal, as the Houthis have become a security threat for it, too, and Israeli military forces in Somaliland will certainly help it fight them.
In recent years, Somaliland allowed the UAE to use the port of Berbera and its airport as a base for its military activity in Yemen, in return for a $440 million UAE investment in Berbera port, according to foreign media. The UAE mediation follows its military cooperation with Israel, the two having reportedly established a joint military-intelligence base on the Socotra archipelago, one of the world’s remotest, most ecologically diverse islands, situated in the Gulf of Aden near Yemen.
Thanks to its military presence and its soft power engines, Turkey has become a key player in East Africa – particularly in the Horn of Africa.Eytan Cohen Yanarocak
“There are numerous advantages for Israel in recognizing Somaliland as an independent state,” points out Ahmet Vefa Rende, a researcher at the Middle East Institute at Turkey’s Sakarya University, who first reported the contacts between Israel and Somaliland.
“These include enhancing its national security, countering regional threats, creating new economic opportunities, improving diplomatic relations and supporting democratic governance in the region. In a region where many powers are competing for a share due to its strategic location and resources, Israel is expected to enter the race through local partner Somaliland, which is excluded by many countries.”
For local regional powers, the location of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa lends it strategic importance along with economic appeal. It is situated at the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb straits, through which a third of the world’s maritime cargo is shipped, and its long coastline along the bay provides it with diverse maritime accessibility – to East Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Sea and from there to the Indian Ocean.
The most important element in this maritime tapestry is the Red Sea sphere, which over the last year has become a focal point for international tension due to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping routes that affect the entire global trade. Last December, several firms had to halt shipping near the Red Sea. Maersk was the first, after the Houthis attacked two of its ships. It was followed by China’s OOCL, Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd, France’s CMA CGM and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), the world’s biggest shipping firm.
On December 14, 2023, the Houthis announced the blocking of the Bab al-Mandeb straits, and exactly one month later they fired a missile from the Yemeni port of Hudeidah at an American ship. The missile was shot down. The firing of the Houthi missile came after American forces attacked the port to enable the resumption of regular maritime traffic. The Houthis continued their terrorist activities along with their efforts to hit targets in Israel using drones and ballistic missiles.
On July 18, the U.S. and Britain staged a joint attack on Hudeidah’s international airport, and two days later the Israeli Air Force carried out an attack on the port of Hudeidah, coordinated with the Americans and Saudi Arabia. All this has unfolded against the backdrop of Israeli concern about Iran’s attempts to gain a foothold in the Red Sea arena. These attempts have taken the form of increased Houthi terrorist activities as well as the presence of Iranian warships and intelligence ships.
The main contenders
Despite tensions with the Houthis, Israel is merely a secondary player in the teeming arena of interests around Somaliland. The three main players in the conflict are Somalia, Ethiopia and Turkey, with Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and neighboring Djibouti also keeping their hands in the pot. Up above hover the world’s two superpowers, the United States and China.
The great fear is that the crisis that developed between Somalia and Ethiopia over the future of Somaliland will ignite into a bloody conflict that pulls in additional countries. This could happen in light of the ongoing war between Israel and Iran with its Houthi proxy in Yemen, the presence of murderous Islamist militias in the Horn of Africa and the bloody history of Somalia and Ethiopia. The two countries have a history of territorial conflicts, including two wars in the late 20th century.
The move that gave rise to the current crisis between them took place on the first day of 2024. Ethiopia, which borders Somalia and has no maritime access, signed a historic agreement with Somaliland that will give it access to the Gulf of Aden through the port of Berbera, in return for eventual Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland’s independence. To Somaliland, Ethiopia’s recognition is an important step that could help other countries in Africa and beyond follow suit.
For Ethiopia, which views itself as a regional power in Africa but is suffering from economic frailty and widespread poverty, sea access is an important key to financial growth and greater geopolitical power. With over 130 million inhabitants, this is the world’s most populous country with no sea access.
The agreement allows Ethiopia to lease a military naval base at the port of Berbera and to trade from it. AFP reported that Somaliland agreed to lease 20 kilometers (12 miles) of its coastline to Ethiopia for 50 years, and to allow Ethiopia to establish a naval base and a commercial port there.
This step was also made possible by the UAE, which had been developing the port of Berbera in recent years for its own interests, and encourages maritime trade there. The agreement also serves the economic interests of Somaliland, which is expected to reap dividends – from tariff revenues to commercial cooperation – through the port activity of a large country like Ethiopia.
The agreement provoked a sharp response from Somalia, with the government declaring it illegal and a threat to regional stability. The Ethiopian ambassador to Somalia was summoned for a reprimand and the Somali ambassador was recalled from Addis Ababa. “The Somali government recognizes Ethiopia’s actions as a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia,” a statement from the Somali government said, vowing to defend its territory “by all legal means.”
Meanwhile, Somalia rushed to strengthen its relations with Turkey, which has over the last two decades become an important ally, in order to increase Ankara’s influence in Africa, particularly in the Red Sea region. Somalia signed a security and naval cooperation agreement with Turkey, giving Turkey control of Somalia’s territorial water – including offshore from Somaliland – in return for revenues from resources extracted there by Turkey, primarily crude oil and natural gas reserves.
Turkey began increasing its influence in the Horn of Africa region after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Somalia in 2011, when he promised to provide financial aid to the civil war-scarred country and restart basic education and health services. Turkey then extended its influence in Somalia on several levels, with infrastructure and research projects; oil and gas explorations off the Somalian shore; mediation between Somalia and its neighbors as well as dissident forces inside the country; and the most important aspect – a military cooperation that led to the construction of a Turkish military base in Mogadishu in 2017. It is Turkey’s largest overseas base, intended for training Somali soldiers. Turkey also seized on the slowdown in Chinese investments in Africa to increase its economic influence in the region, as did the UAE and Egypt.
Meanwhile, Turkey has been using its clout to try to hammer out a compromise between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Somaliland crisis, thanks to its good relations with Ethiopia. Somalia, for its part, does not wish to become dependent on Erdogan’s whims, and in order to reduce its dependency on Turkey it also signed a security agreement with Egypt this year, under which the Egyptians have committed to send soldiers and military equipment to Somalia if tensions rise. Despite the warming of ties between Egypt and Turkey in recent years, Cairo views Turkey’s increasing hold south of Egypt with concern, and is attempting to increase its own clout in the Horn of Africa.
Turkish beltway
Now, Turkey is interested in a tie-breaking move with security ramifications for the entire region, including Israel. In September, Bloomberg reported that Erdogan’s emissaries conducted talks with Somalia about setting up a long-range missile launching test site on Somali territory. Somalia’s location on the Eastern edge of Africa will allow Turkey to conduct maritime tests on the ballistic missile it has developed, which has a range of 565 kilometers (351 miles), and is known as Tayfun (in Turkish) or Typhoon. In addition, Turkey is reportedly looking into conducting tests on launching rockets to space from Somali territory. The Turkish government has been promoting a space program for years, as part of Erdogan’s wish to increase his country’s power and prestige and to join the club of world powers.
The missile program is causing concern among Turkey’s neighbors, due to Erdogan’s goal of doubling the current range of its missiles. “As of today, the range of our missiles is 565 kilometers. This is not enough. We will increase it to 1,000 kilometers,” Erdogan said in 2023, after Turkey’s secret missile program came to light.
With the successful testing of the Typhoon missile in May 2023, it has since gone into production. The assessment is that Turkey is interested in conducting tests in Somalia in order to achieve a 1,000-kilometer launching capability far from the eyes of its neighbors. Erdogan, known for his belligerent statements, caused real concern in Greece when he threatened Athens in 2022. “Now we are starting to build our rockets. “Of course, this production scares the Greeks. When you say ‘Tayfun,’ the Greek gets scared and say, ‘It will hit Athens.’ Well, of course it will,” Erdogan is quoted as saying at an event near the Black Sea two years ago.
Tension between Turkey and Greece has been ongoing for 200 years, including four violent clashes between the two countries between the late 19th century and 1922. In addition, Turkey is still in control of Northern Cyprus, a territory it occupied during the civil war in the island in 1974 after the then-leader of Cyprus, archbishop Makarios III, announced his desire for a political union with Greece.
But what does Turkey need a missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers for? “Turkey is a regional power and is in a rivalry with Iran,” says Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on Turkey at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. “As long as their missiles are of the current range, they can only threaten Greece.”
How about Israel? A 1,000km ballistic missile from Turkey puts us right within range.
“True, though there is no official statement against us of the type that Erdogan directed at Greece.”
Erdogan may yet threaten us with rockets if we don’t pull out of Gaza.
“We have not reached that stage yet. But in the case of Erdogan, there is serious potential for threats on his part.”
Cohen Yanarocak maintains that Turkey’s strategy in Africa has paid off. “Thanks to its military presence and its soft power engines, Turkey has become a key player in East Africa – particularly in the Horn of Africa,” he points out. “Turkey’s ability to initiate a change in policy by East African countries is a pinnacle of Turkish influence in the region.”
He says that the most important ingredient in Turkey’s success story is respect. “Unlike the superpowers that approached African countries with a colonial, ethnocentric attitude, Turkey shows respect to Africans, who have similar religious and cultural codes – especially Muslim African countries. The Africans feel it.”
Meanwhile, the escalating crisis around Somaliland may be solved by the smallest, weakest country in the region – Djibouti, trapped between Somaliland, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Red Sea, with a population of about one million. Despite its small size, the country is home to several foreign ports, naval bases and airforce bases, primarily American, Chinese and French, thanks to its strategic location. In an effort to end the crisis, Djibouti offered Ethiopia one of its own sea ports, that could serve as an alternative to Somaliland.